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UNTOLD TRUTHS: THE EXCLUSION OF
ENFORCED STERILIZATIONS FROM THE
PERUVIAN TRUTH COMMISSION'S
FINAL REPORT
JOCELYN E. GETGEN*
ASTIAc'r: This Article argues that the exclusion of enforced steriliza-
tion cases from the Peruvian Truth Commission's investigation and Fi-
nal Report effectively erases State responsibility and decreases the like-
lihood for justice and reparations for women victims-survivors of State-
sponsored violence in Peru. In a context of deep cultural and economic
divides and violent conflict, this Article recounts how the State's Family
Planning Program violated Peruvian women's reproductive rights by
sterilizing low-income, indigenous Quechua-speaking women without
informed consent. This Article argues that these systematic reproductive
injustices constitute an act of genocide, proposes an independent in-
quiry, and advocates for a more inclusive investigation and final report
for future truth commissions whose goals include truth, accountability,
and justice for all victims-survivors of state-sponsored violence. Leaders
responsible for the enforced sterilization of more than 200,000 Peruvian
women, including former President Alberto Ken'ya Fujimori, must be
held accountable for past violations in order to fully realize future rec-
onciliation and justice in Peru.
* J.D., Cornell Law School; M.P.H., Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health; B.A., Cornell University. Women and Justice Fellow, Cornell Law School. The au-
thor would like to thank Lisa Laplante for her essential support and contributions to re-
search conducted in Peru. In addition, the author would like to recognize Professor Billie
Jean Isbell, Dr. Carlos Ivfin Degregori Caso, Dr. Salom6n Lerner Febres and Eduardo Gon-
z~ilez Cueva for their meaningful contributions toward an understanding of the context of
the internal conflict in Peru. Also, the author thanks her family and friends for their undy-
ing love and support. Finally, the author would like to dedicate this Article to the women
of the world who have suffered and died as a result of government campaigns of enforced
sterilization. May their voices be heard and may we move toward a world where reproduc-
tive justice and freedom are rights enjoyed by all.
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"[E]very society has the inalienable right to know the truth about past
events, as well as the motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes
came to be committed.. .. "
INTRODUCTION
Does time heal all wounds? Can a transitioning democratic society
move forward without fully facing the human rights violations that
plague its past? Or can only truth and justice reconcile large-scale
abuses? Difficult lessons from the recent past have taught societies and
nations that legitimate democracies require political and personal ac-
countability reinforced by the rule of law.2 International human rights
treaties thus impose upon states a duty to investigate, criminally prose-
cute, and punish perpetrators of crimes against humanity.3 Although
state actions taken in response to gross violations of human rights are
never truly adequate when communities, families, and individuals suf-
fer irreparable harms, inaction is invariably worse. 4 A state's failure to
respond appropriately and justly to gross human rights abuses can give
victims the sense that their perpetrators emerged either victorious or
with clean hands.5
The Peruvian government's response to twenty years of human
rights abuses from 1980 to 2000 included creating a truth commission
with a broad mandate to "promote national reconciliation, the rule of
justice and the strengthening of the constitutional democratic re-
gime." 6 By forming the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion (CVR),7 the State initiated a process of achieving national recon-
ciliation through an attempt to correct the historical record, provide
a collective memory and preserve the possibility of criminal account-
ability and justice. 8
I GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUS-
TICE 328 (The New Press 2006) (1999) (quoting the IAC ANNUAL REPORT 193 (Sept. 26,
1986)).
2 SeeJOHN BORNEMAN, SETTLING ACCOUNTS: VIOLENCE, JUSTICE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN POSTSOCIALIST EUROPE 3 (1997).
3 See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 327-28.
4 See MARTHA MINow, BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY, LAW, AND REPAIR
15-16 (2002).
5 See id. at 16.
6 Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 1 (June 2, 2001) (Peru).
7 Comisi6n de la Verdad y Reconciliaci6n.
8 See Amnesty Int'l, Peru: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission-A First Step Towards a
Country Without Injustice, AI Index AMR 46/003/2004, 1-2 (Aug. 2004); PRISCILLA B.
HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 24-31
(2002) (discussing the basic objectives of a truth commission: "to discover, clarify, and for-
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In many respects, the CVR is a model for future truth commissions
that strive to end impunity, attend to the needs of victims, initiate state
investigations and systemic reforms, gain a critical perspective to con-
front internal conflict, and condemn individuals and institutions for
abuses.9 Although this Commission serves as an ambitious and inclusive
mechanism for accountability and truth-telling, it fails to provide a re-
cord and voice to more than 200,000 marginalized, indigenous
Quechua-speaking women in Peru who were victims of a State-
sponsored enforced sterilization campaign.10 The exclusion of large-
scale reproductive rights abuses committed against the poorest and
most marginalized sectors of Peruvian society demonstrates a weakness
of the C4, impedes justice for these individuals, and provides further
lessons for truth commissions of the future." With large-scale human
rights abuses occurring in conflicts and transitioning regimes around
the world-the internal and international conflicts in Iraq, for exam-
ple' 2-the transitional justice community must responsibly ensure that
the collective memory includes all victims and that their voices are not
mally acknowledge past abuses; to respond to specific needs of victims; to contribute to jus-
tice and accountability;, to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; and to
promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past"); MiNow, supra note 4, at 24-27.
See generally RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: LE-
GrrIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001) (describing the truth-telling and reconcilia-
tion functions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
9 See CoMIsI6N DE ENTREGA DE LA CoMIsI6N DE LA VERDAD Y RECONCILL4CI6N, HATUN
WILLAKUY: VERSI6N ABREVIADA DEL INFORME FINAL DE LA CoMIsI6N DE LA VERDAD Y RECON-
CILIACI6N 433-65 (2004); TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, GENERAL
CONCLUSIONS passim (2003) available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifmal/conclu-
siones.php [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
10 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-20. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 9. These
women predominantly lived in rural areas in the Andes and Peruvian Amazon. Amnesty
Int'l, supra note 8, at 20.
11 See discussion infra Part I1.
12 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, PostconfliaJustice in Iraq, 33 HuM. RTs. 15 passim (2006)
(highlighting the violent and widespread conflict in Iraq and advocating for a post-conflict
justice strategy that includes prosecution of offenders, a victim compensation scheme, the
creation of a historic commission, and revamping the Iraqi legal system); Jennifer Moore,
Collective Security with a Human Face: An International Legal Framework for oordinated Action to
Alleviate Violence and Poverty, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 43 passim (2004) (finding a legal
obligation to promote human security in certain international human rights documents and
arguing that security will not be established until political and civil liberties and secure and
basic economic and social needs are met); NGO Coordination Comm. in Iraq & Oxfarn Int'l,
Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq, Briefing Paper 105, July 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/18 07 07 oxfamiraq.pdf (calling for an
increase in humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq and estimating that eight million
Iraqis are in need of emergency aid).
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silenced in the future processes of truth and reconciliation. 13 Further-
more, with Peru's current step toward accountability and transitional
justice-the trial of former President Alberto Ken'ya Fujimori-advo-
cates and other members of civil society must push for reproductive
justice for the victims-survivors of enforced sterilization in Peru in or-
der to move toward truth, justice, and reconciliation for all.1 4
This Article argues that the exclusion of enforced sterilizations
cases in the CVR's investigation and Final Report effectively erases State
responsibility and greatly decreases the likelihood that Peru will seek
justice for the victims of these violations of reproductive rights. Part I
provides an overview of the sharp cultural and economic divides in Pe-
ruvian society, examines the history of violent conflict in Peru from
1980 to 2000, and recounts how healthcare providers violated Peruvian
women's reproductive rights when they sterilized low-income, indige-
nous Quechua-speaking women either against their will or without in-
formed consent through the State's Family Planning Program. Part II
discusses the creation and implementation of the CVR through its ex-
ecutive mandate. Part II challenges the reasons for excluding these
cases in the Commission's investigation and Final Report and also ex-
amines the effects of these omissions. Part IV proposes an independent
inquiry with regard to these abuses and advocates for a more inclusive
investigation and final report for future truth commissions whose goals
include truth, accountability, and justice.
Is Cf David M. Crane, White Man's Justice: Applying International Justice After Regional
Third World Conflicts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1683, 1684 (2006) (advocating for victims' cen-
tral role in the truth, reconciliation, and justice process). See generally KADER ASMAL ET AL.,
RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING OF APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE
(1997) (discussing the need for reconciliation through collective memory and corrective
action); JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED
NATION? (2004) (discussing the truth and reconciliation process of transitional justice in
South Africa); RuTI G. TITEL, TIRANSrrIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (discussing various concepts
of transitional justice and the rule of law in times of political change); Ruti Teitel, The Law
and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 837 (2005) (reviewing
contemporary developments in transitional justice).
14 See supra notes 8, 12; Fujimori on Trial: Accountability in Action, http://fujimorion
trial.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2008) (providing news and analysis regarding the Fujimori
trial).
[Vol. 29:1
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I. THE PATHS TO VIOLENT CONFLICT
A. Indigenous Peoples in Peruvian Society
Tawantinsuyu's15 destruction and Peru's birth began when the
Spanish Conquistadors invaded Incan lands, captured the last Incan
ruler, Atahualpa, and massacred thousands of Incan warriors in the
Andean city of Cajamarca in 1532.16 During the first one hundred years
of colonial rule and oppression in Peru, the indigenous population in
the Andes region plummeted from nine million to six hundred-
thousand people.17 From this swift defeat and near destruction of the
highland indigenous peoples of Peru emerged the myth of the "van-
quished race": that the Incas and their descendants lacked decision-
making ability and individual initiative and, thus, "could or should be
exterminated, 'civilized,' instructed, or saved." I8
Spanish colonial rule guaranteed impoverishment and death for
many indigenous Peruvians and perpetuated the fragmented and di-
vided structures that continue to exist in Peruvian society today.19 First,
a geographical divide exists between the coastal region-predominately
urban, white and Spanish-speaking-and the highlands-mostly rural,
indigenous and Quechua-speaking. 20 In addition, the coastal region
boasts an overwhelming majority of the nation's wealth and political
power, and, as a result, political and economic programs in past re-
gimes have largely ignored or neglected the needs of the indigenous
peoples in the highlands and rainforest regions. 21 Moreover, there are
racial and ethnic gaps that divide Peruvian society among groups of
Spanish descent (criollos), mixed Spanish and indigenous descent (mes-
tizos), indigenous of Andean origin who have moved to the urban cen-
15 Tawantinsuyu is the name of the pre-colonial Incan Empire. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRI-
TANICA, SCURLOCK-TIRAH IX, 845 (15th ed. 1983).
16 See THE PERU READER: HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICS 81, 102-06 (Orin Starn et al.
eds., 1995).
17 Id. at 82.
Is Id. at 81-82.
19 See id. at 112; AMERICAS WATCH, PERU UNDER FIRE: HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE RE-
TURN TO DEMOCRACY 1 (1992).
20 AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 1; Carlos Ivfn Degregori, Comm'r, Peruvian
Truth & Reconciliation Comm'n, Questions of Violence and Racism in a Diverse Society:
The Findings of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Address at Cornell
Law School (Nov. 28, 2005) (transcript available with the author).
21 AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 1.
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ters of the country (cholos) and indigenous who continue to live a more
traditional way of life in the highlands (indigenas).22
Although today indigenous groups are beginning to organize po-
litically and socially to demand individual and collective rights from the
State,23 invidious discrimination and economic, cultural and social di-
vides still exist at all levels of Peruvian society.24 In Peru, indigenous
peoples continue to be seen as second-class citizens, a racist view estab-
lished through these divides, their situations of extreme poverty, and
the inadequate access to basic health care and education.
2 5
B. Twenty Years of Violent Internal Conflict in Peru
1. Setting the Stage for State-Sponsored Violence
Before the Peruvian government committed more than 200,000
enforced sterilizations against indigenous Quechua-speaking women
through its Family Planning Program during the 1990s, the internal
conflict between insurgent groups and the State created an environ-
ment of fear in which few openly questioned government policies.2 6 At
first, violence in Peru erupted in 1980 when the Maoist armed gov-
ernment opposition group, the Shining Path,27 initiated a political,
"popular" war against the State.28 At that time, Peru had begun its tran-
22 See MARIA ELENA GARCiA, MAKING INDIGENOUS CITIZENS: IDENTITY, DEVELOPMENT,
AND MULTICULTURAL ACTIVISM IN PERU 27-29 (2005); Degregori, supra note 20.
23 See generally GARCiA, supra note 22 (discussing the issues surrounding indigenous
mobilization and citizenship in Peru).
24 See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 1-3; ENRIQUE MAYER, THE ARTICULATED
PEASANT: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIES IN THE ANDES 322 (2002); Degregori, supra note 20.
25 See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 1-3; MAYER, supra note 24, at 322-23;
Degregori, supra note 20.
26 See Eduardo Gonzilez Cueva, The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the
Challenge of Impunity, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND
TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 70, 71-72 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza &Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006);
Degregori, supra note 20.
27 Sendero Luminoso.
28 See Steve J. Stern, Introduction to Part III, in SHINING AND OTHER PATHS: WAR AND
SOCIETY IN PERU, 1980-1995, at 262-63 (Steve J. Stern ed., 1998); Degregori, supra note
20 (arguing that the CVR's final report highlighted the political will of the Shining Path
rather than digging deeper into the "structural violence" and poverty of the State). Al-
though the CVR's report acknowledged that these structural concepts formed the back-
ground of the conflict, the concepts alone were not seen as enough to explain the extent
of the violence suffered. See Degregori, supra note 20. In addition, many social movements
of the time used the structural factors and widespread poverty to justify violence. See id.
The Shining Path actually argued that the State and the Peruvian people should not chas-
tise the group for killing some reactionaries when many more multitudes of people were
[Vol. 29:1
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sition from a military regime to a civilian democracy; however, the Mao-
ist faction did not participate in the left's incorporation into the politi-
cal system.29 Instead of taking part in elections, Shining Path members
launched their communist-Maoist campaign by attacking the voter reg-
istration office in Chuschi, a small town in the central highlands of the
Ayacucho province, before dawn on Election Day in 1980.30 This politi-
cal spark ignited a fire in a country with great disparity between rich
and poor, abject rural poverty, geographic exclusion in the Andes and
Amazon regions, and invidious discrimination and racism among eth-
nic and racial groups. 31
Next, the absence of a strong, unchallenged democratic transition,
combined with the presence of the revolutionary movement of the
Shining Path, caused the government to react with authoritarian rule
and military force, which then served to escalate the initial outbreaks of
violence.32 Fernando Belainde's newly-elected government, in re-
sponse to increasing social unrest, imposed states of emergency in de-
partments throughout the country.33 In addition, the Armed Forces
used racial profiling and killed indiscriminately in areas of conflict with
the Peruvian government's knowledge and acquiescence.34 In this con-
text, the Shining Path gained support and momentum as some rural
peasant communities began to view the guerillas as the lesser of two
evils during the beginning of the armed struggle.35
At first, certain peasant communities, such as those in the district
of Chuschi, also backed the Shining Path's efforts because the Shin-
ing Path's short-term goals aligned with their own: to drive out ene-
mies in their towns who were gaining power, to establish better-quality
dying of hunger and malnutrition each day in Peru. See id.; Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26,
at 71.
29 Anna-Britt Coe, From Anti-Natalist to Ultra-Conservative: Restricting Reproductive Choice
in Peru, 12 REPROD. HEALTH MATrERS 56, 59 (2004); see GUsTAvo GORRITI, THE SHINING
PATH: A HISTORY OF THE MILLENARIAN WAR IN PERU 10-11 (Robin Kirk trans., The Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press 1999) (1990).
0 GORRITI, supra note 29, at 17; Billie Jean Isbell, Shining Path and Peasant Responses in
Rural Ayacucho, in THE SHINING PATH OF PERU 77, 89-90 (David Scott Palmer ed., 2d ed.
1994).
31 See Degregori, supra note 20.
32 See id.; Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 71-72 (noting that "[t]he combined action
of guerilla organizations, military units and local self-defense groups acting under the
command, or with the acquiescence of the state" actually caused the bulk of the deaths
that the CVR estimates occurred during the whole twenty-year period).
33 See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 6.
34 See Degregori, supra note 20.
35 See id. The slogan at the time was that the "Shining Path has one thousand eyes and
one thousand ears," while the State fights blindly. Id.
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schools, and to end government corruption.3 6 To some communities,
the revolution and "New Peru" meant that they would finally free
themselves from abusive bureaucrats and public officials and return
to the consensus framework with which traditional authorities gov-
erned in the past.37 In time, however, the Shining Path began to reor-
ganize peasant communities toward its ideology of a "future without
distinctions" in class or wealth and to assume authoritarian power
over them; as a result, the Andean people came to see the Shining
Path as nothing more than new oppressors.38 "[I]nstead of becoming
the revolutionary vanguard in the communities, Shining Path [was]
perceived.., as a new form of haqa, the supernatural being that robs
body fat" in Andean mythology to pay off a debt.39 The Shining Path
eventually lost what little peasant community support it had, and An-
dean citizens complied with military orders to organize civil defense
patrols in order to resist the efforts of Shining Path insurgents.40
The Shining Path focused its class war in the countryside, the
"principal theater" of its actions, and complemented these efforts by
supporting armed strikes and mobilizations in the city.41 At first, the
Shining Path's motives remained a mystery to most urban Peruvians;
the cryptic messages- "Teng Hsiao-ping, son of a bitch" -wrapped
around dead dogs hanging from streetlamps in Lima seemed to them
to border on insanity.42 Soon, however, the dynamite attacks and kill-
ings intensified, and the uprising turned into a bloodbath that could
no longer be underestimated or ignored.43
While the Armed Forces devised new strategies to defeat the Shin-
ing Path, the nation's social and political composition shifted under the
structural factors of a modernizing Peru. 44 First, a significant number
of Peruvians migrated from the rural areas to the cities, largely due to
the development of a market economy, increased transportation, and
as displaced persons of the armed conflict.45 In addition, the relatively
361sbell, supra note 30, at 89-90.
37 Id.
38 See id. at 90-92.
39 Id. at 92.
40 See id. at 79-80, 87.
41 GORROTI, supra note 29, at 68.
42 Id. at 76, 78.
43 See id. at 94-95, 104. The Shining Path developed the idea of the "quota": the will-
ingness and expectation of its members to sacrifice their own lives when asked to do so by
the party. Id. at 104.
4See Degregori, supra note 20.
45 See id. The number of desplazados (internally displaced persons) exceeded 600,000 at
the height of the armed conflict. Id.
[Vol. 29:1
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independent media and political and social organizations proved that
some level of democracy existed and fostered a rejection of the totali-
tarianism of the Shining Path movement.4 Finally, in 1992, the Peru-
vian police antiterrorism unit captured Abimael GuzmAn, the leader of
the Shining Path, who subsequently negotiated peace accords with the
Fujimori government and facilitated the fast demoralization and defeat
of Shining Path sympathizers. 47
Guzmin's capture followed Alberto Fujimori's election in 1990
and "self-coup" (autogolpe), which abruptly ended the rule of law in
1992.48 Fujimori implemented a strategy to combat an economic crisis
and government subversion; he suppressed civil liberties and eroded
political institutions and notions of accountability.49 Then, when faced
with congressional opposition to his oppressive measures, he joined
forces with the military, suspended the Constitution, censored the me-
dia, dissolved the National Congress, and incapacitated the judiciary.50
Even after the capture of the leading subversives and the awareness of a
crumbling insurgency, Fujimori's repressive authoritarian regime used
public fear and isolated incidences of violence to justify continued hu-
man rights abuses and political suppression throughout the 1990s.5 1
46 See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 19, at 3 (describing the media as investigators, "in-
formal ombudsmen," and as a channel for opinion and information in Peruvian society);
Degregori, supra note 20. In addition, the Shining Path did not have an alternative to offer
the peasant populations after the destruction of the "old order." Degregori, supra note 20.
Most significantly, the movement ignored the needs of the peasant families in the Andes.
Degregori, supra note 20.
47 See Degregori, supra note 20; Gonzhlez Cueva, supra note 26, at 72; see also Stern, su-
pra note 28, at 297.
48 See Gonzfilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 72; Stern, supra note 28, at 417; see also Inter-
view with Eduardo Gonzhlez Cueva, Senior Associate, International Center for Transitional
Justice, former Director, Public Hearings and Victims and Witnesses Protection Unit, Pe-
ruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in N.Y, NY (Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter
Gonzilez Cueva Interview].
49 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, § II(D); see CATHERINE M. CONAGHAN, FUJIMORI'S
PERU: DECEPTION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 29, 252-53 (2005).
50 See Kent Anderson, An Asian Pinochet?-Not Likely: The Unfulfilled International Law
Promise in Japan's Treatment of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L.
177, 180-81 (2002); Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 72.
51 See Anderson, supra note 50, at 181; Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 73; Gonzilez
Cueva Interview, supra note 48.
2009]
HeinOnline -- 29 B.C. Third World L.J. 9 2009
Boston College Third World Law Journal
2. State-Sponsored Enforced Sterilizations Under the Family Planning
Program: "Voluntary" Surgical Contraception (Anticoncepci6n
Quinirgica Voluntaria-AQV)
Three months after President Fujimori took office in 1990, he an-
nounced a "birth control policy" as a way to bring equal access to con-
traception for the nation's poor.52 At that time, however, high inflation,
a lack of public funding, a focus on the internal conflict, and legal bar-
riers in place against sterilizations forced the government to proceed
slowly despite its support for reforms in family planning programs in
Peru.53 Fujimori's reelection gave his regime a strong mandate for im-
plementing its plans, and in 1995, Congress approved a modification of
the National Population Law of 1985 to permit sterilization as a family
planning method.54 At the same time, Fujimori garnered support from
feminists and advocates for the rights of women when, in 1995, he at-
tended and spoke in Beijing at the Fourth International World Confer-
ence on Women. 55
In 1996, after finding an inverse relationship between population
growth and economic growth, Fujimori's administration quietly im-
plemented a demographic policy for population control. 56 A stable
economy and widespread political support allowed Fujimori's regime to
openly confront the Catholic Church and its strong political positions
with regard to reproductive rights and choice. 57 Additionally, interna-
52 CARLOS E. ARAMBURU, POLITICS AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH: A DANGEROUS CON-
NECTION 7 (2002), available at http://www.cicred.org/Eng/Seminars/Details/Seminars/
Bangkok2002/03BangkokAramburu.pdf; Carlos Cdceres et al., Sexual and Reproductive
Rights Policies in Peru: Unveiling False Paradoxes, in SEXPOLrrIcS: REPORTS FROM THE FRONT
LINES 127, 137 (Richard Parker et al. eds., 2006). The traditional demographic argument
was coupled with the argument advocating for equal rights, which focused on individual
and family rights. ARAMBURU, supra, at 8.
53 See ARAMBURU, supra note 51, at 8.
54 See id. at 7-8.
55 See MARUJA BARRIG, THE PERSISTENCE OF MEMORY: FEMINISM AND THE STATE IN
PERU IN THE 1990S, CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN THE ANDES AND THE
SOUTHERN CONE COMPARATIVE REGIONAL PROJECT 12-13 (1999).
56 See SUBCOMISION INVESTIGADORA DE PERSONAS E INSTITUCIONES INVOLUCRADAS EN
ACCIONES DE ANTICONCEPCI6N QUIRORGICA VOLUNTARIA [SUB-COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE
PEOPLE AND INSTS. INVOLVED IN VOLUNTARY SURGICAL CONTRACEPTION PROC.], INFORME
FINAL SOBRE LA APLICACION DE LA ANTICONCEPCI6N QUIR(JRGICA VOLUNTARIA 11 (2002)
[hereinafter AQVJ; Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 138; Coe, supra note 29, at 61.
57 See Coe, supra note 29, at 59 (asserting that when Fujimori first took power, he faced
many challenges, including violent internal conflict, a weak economy, and inflation. To
address these concerns, Fujimori needed the backing of the Catholic Church (which op-
posed modern contraceptive methods)); COMITt DE AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE PARA
LA DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DE LA MUJER [LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COMMIT-
[Vol. 29:1
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tional and domestic pressures existed to address the widening gap
among socio-economic classes of Peruvians; thus, Fujimori's govern-
ment promoted contraceptive services to "the most deprived sectors of
society" in a stated effort to alleviate poverty on a massive scale.58
During this time, Fujimori continued to actively promote universal
access to contraception for women.5 9 His political discourse invoked
principles of social justice and human rights; his rhetoric even included
using the reproductive justice movement's language, stating that "poor
women deserved the same opportunity as wealthier women to regulate
their fertility, and [that] all women had the right to control their bodies
and use contraceptives if they wished."60 With Fujimori's control over
Congressional action, the Ministry of Health soon drafted its first com-
prehensive reproductive health program. 61 Additional government
measures-including creating agencies and passing laws-also stressed
the importance of equality between men and women. 62
The government's aggressive Family Planning Program focused
on increasing the number of sterilizations performed on Peruvian
women and specifically targeted the low-income, indigenous women
at the margins of society.63 Moreover, government officials deter-
mined annual numeric goals and targets for the sterilization programs
and initiated an obligatory quota system for health care providers to
meet as program employees in order to remain employed, obtain
monetary compensation, or receive a promotion. 64 Later investiga-
tions revealed that health care provider practices included compen-
sating women and subjecting them to aggression, intimidation, and
TEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS] (CLADEM) & CTR. FOR REPROD. L. AND POL'Y
(CRLP), SILENCE AND COMPLICITY: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN PERUVIAN PUBLIC
HEALTH FACILITIES 36 (1999) [hereinafter CLADEM & CRLP].
58 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20. See Coe, supra note 29, at 59. A Program Manager
at the Ministry of Health made the following statement in 1998:
The fertility rate among poor women is 6.9 children-they are poor and are
producing more poor people. The president is aware that the government
cannot fight poverty without reducing poor people's fertility. Thus, demo-
graphic goals are a combination of the population's right to access family
planning and the government's anti-poverty strategy.
Coe, supra note 29, at 61-62.
59 Coe, supra note 29, at 60; see Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 138.
60 Coe, supra note 29, at 60; see Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 138-39.
61 Coe, supra note 29, at 60.
62 Id. at 61.
6 Id. at 62; seeAmnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20; Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 138.
6 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20; Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 140; CLADEM
& CRLP, supra note 57, at 63; Coe, supra note 29, at 62.
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humiliation-all measures that did not include informed consent.65
For example, health care providers denied women their fundamental
rights to informed consent when professionals pressured women to
undergo surgical sterilization during "Tubal Ligation Festivals" and at
locations designated for food aid distribution.66 Some providers of-
fered women surgical sterilization as the only free method of contra-
ception available. 67 Other health workers did not provide women with
information regarding other available birth control methods and
many times deliberately gave inaccurate information about the risks
and consequences of surgical sterilization procedures. 68 Some women
even reported that professionals in clinics and hospitals intimidated
them as they sought medical attention for abortion complications. 69
The practice of State-sponsored enforced sterilization also caused
numerous deaths due to medical negligence and malpractice. 70 Hu-
man rights groups brought one illustrative case, Maria Mamrita Me-
stanza Chfivez v. Peri, to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights when a thirty-three-year-old, low-income, illiterate woman with
seven children died after a coerced surgical sterilization procedure. 71
Health officials falsely accused Mestanza of violating the law by having
more than five children and threatened to report her to the authori-
ties if she did not submit to surgical sterilization. 72 Health care pro-
viders succeeded in coercing Mestanza to undergo a tubal ligation
procedure and failed to examine her prior to the surgery.73 Following
the tubal ligation procedure, the health center released Mestanza
65 See Coe, supra note 29, at 62. Coe treads lighdy on blame when talking about the
abuses that occurred. See id. She shows how sterilization was promoted through services
that withheld temporary methods of birth control, such as injections and birth control
pills. Id. She does conclude by saying that "[b]latant deception, economic incentives and
threats were also used," but she does not mention the extent of the abuses. See id.
66 See Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 140; CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 63-64
(information taken from collective interviews of health care providers).
67 See CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 63-64.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 64.
70 See Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 140; Gonzalo E. Gianella, jPor qui Tendria que
Haber Sucedido de Otro Modo? Notas Sobre Esterilizaciones y Genocidio en el Peri, Ciberayllu, Aug.
30, 2004, http://www.andes.missouri.edu/andes/Ciberayllu.shtml.
71 Maria Mam6rita Mestanza Chivez v. Peri6, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
71/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/l.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 (2003). See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., BRIEFING
PAPER: REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROMOTION AND
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (2002), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/
pdf/pub bprr interamerican.pdf. (hereinafter CrT. FOR REPROD. Rrs.].
72 See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 71, at 15.
73 See id.
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even though they were aware that she suffered from serious complica-
tions as a result of the surgery.74 A few days later, Mestanza's partner
attempted to seek emergency medical care from physicians at the
health center, but the physicians refused and reassured him that the
effects of the anesthesia had not yet worn off.75 As a result, Mestanza
died in her home nine days after her surgical sterilization. 76
Coerced and forced sterilization practices contradict Peru's con-
stitutional and legal protections for its citizens. 77 At first, human rights
activists and non-governmental organizations criticized the govern-
ment's focus on high numeric goals that were bound to lead to
abuses, as the practices were extremely secretive. 78 Later, women's ad-
vocacy groups documented the specific instances of abuse and sent
their findings to the Public Ombudsman on Women's Rights. 79 Fi-
nally, in December 1997, La Repfiblica, one of Peru's major newspa-
pers, reported an independent investigation and detailed findings on
the population policy implementation that shocked the public.8°
Once the general public became aware of the extent of Fuji-
mori's demographic policy, a heated debate ensued.81 The Ombuds-
man's office released a report in 1998 of its findings of abuse and rec-
ommended reforms in the government's family planning programs.82
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See Coe, supra note 29, at 62. These acts could be considered genocide, as will be
discussed herein. See infta notes 135-171 and accompanying text. The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide to include meas-
ures intended to prevent births within the group committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. See Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The difficulty with proving these sterili-
zations as genocide is proving the specific intent to destroy the Quechua people. See Geno-
cide Convention, supra; see also Part DI(B), infra, for further discussion.
78 See Coe, supra note 29, at 63.
79 See id. Today, groups of victims-survivors exist to provide support and document the
abuses. See Emily Koren, Contra Su Voluntad: The Involuntary Sterilizations of Peru's Family
Planning Program International Human Rights Advocacy Report 8 (May 22, 2008) (un-
published report, The Center for International Human Rights Advocacy at the University
of Denver) (on file with the author). For instance, La Organizaci6n de Mujeres Esterilizadas
Contra Su Voluntad (The Association of Women Sterilized Against Their Will) provides
support to more than 1000 women members in the Cusco region. Id.
80 See Coe, supra note 29, at 63. The title of the article was "Ligations in exchange for
food." Id. at 63 n.38.
81 Id. at 63.
82 Id.; DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO, SERE INFORMES DEFENSIORALES No. 7, ANTICONCEP-
c16N QUIRURGICA VOLUNTARIA I: CASOS INVESTIGADOS POR LA DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO
(1998).
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Other organizations then backed the report and also pressured the
Peruvian government to take action to reform its policies.83 In March
1998, the Ministry of Health agreed to make changes and reform ster-
ilization services; it eliminated the quotas and implemented new
counseling guidelines, a consent form, a three-day waiting period be-
fore the procedure, a day to recover in a hospital after the surgery,
and certification of health care facilities and physicians.84 Addition-
ally, in 2001, the Peruvian government agreed to settle the case pend-
ing in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by compen-
sating Maria Mestanza's family and by taking responsibility for
violating individual human rights, including the rights to life, physical
integrity and humane treatment, equal protection, and the right to be
free from gender-based violence. 85 As part of the settlement, the gov-
ernment promised to investigate other enforced sterilization cases
and to punish those who had violated Peruvian and international
law.86 At the time of this writing, however, the Peruvian government
has not fully complied with its commitments under the Mestanza set-
tlement.87
II. THE PERUVIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION:
ITS MANDATE AND FINDINGS
Soon after the government reformed its Family Planning Program,
Peru's transition to democracy began in September 2000.88 This regime
change was not due, however, to public outrage at the atrocities com-
mitted during Fujimori's regime, but was largely the result of televised
videos that uncovered a political corruption scandal and implicated
high-level government and military officials, including the head of
Peru's intelligence service, Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN),
Vladimiro Montesinos. 89 Fujimori fled the country in November 2000
and resigned as president via fax from Japan. 90 Thus, unlike the Chil-
8 Coe, supra note 29, at 63.
84 Id.
85 CT. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 71, at 16.
86 Id.
87 INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUM. Rrs., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IACHR 2007: STATUS OF
COMPLIANCE wrrH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE IACHR (2007), http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/2007eng/Chap.2.htm.
8 See CONAGHAN, supra note 49, at 227-34.
89 See id. at 228.
90 See Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 29, at 74. In the end, Congress did not accept Fuji-
mori's letter of resignation and declared hin morally unfit to serve as president. CONA-
GHAN, supra note 49, at 241.
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ean or El Salvadoran transitions, Peru's was a total regime collapse
without a negotiated arrangement, peace accord, or guarantee of im-
punity.91 The peaceful transition to Valentin Paniagua's interim gov-
ernment and the favorable conditions for democratic transition-the
complete collapse of authoritarian rule and the absence of a powerful
insurgency-provided an opportunity to critically examine the past and
to establish a legitimate democratic regime that would guarantee future
individual and collective human rights-including reproductive
rights-in Peru. 92
In response to public and social group pressure, the newly-formed
government established the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission (CVR) 93 in June 2001 to investigate human rights abuses com-
mitted during the twenty-year internal conflict.94 The CVR-composed
of ten men, two women, and one Quechua-speaker 95-was responsible
for determining the conditions that precipitated the violent conflict,
assisting with judicial investigations, drafting reparations proposals, and
recommending reforms.96 Specifically, the CVR mandate charged the
Commission with "clarifying the process, facts and responsibilities of
the terrorist violence and human rights violations produced from May
1980 to November 2000, whether imputable to terrorist organizations
or State agents, as well as proposing initiatives destined to affirm peace
and harmony among Peruvians."97 This broad and inclusive directive
included interpreting and writing the collective memory of the histori-
cal period and fact-finding in individual cases. 98 The mandate also al-
lowed the Commission to determine the appropriateness of identifying
perpetrators who violated criminal law on condition that the responsi-
bilities for such actions would be presumptive and were meant to assist
91 Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 73-74. Fujimori, unlike Pinochet, was an exile
without credibility or impunity. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 332-39.
9 See Supreme Resolution 304-2000-JUS. (2000) (Peru); Gonzilez Cueva, supra note
26, at 74-76.
93 Comisi6n de la Verdad y Reconciliaci6n del Peri.
94 See HAYNER, supra note 8, at 260.
9 See Degregori, supra note 20. The one Quechua-speaker was Alberto Morote Sinchez,
a former Rector of the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho. Comisi6n de la Verdad y
Reconcilaci6n, Nuestra Labor: Comisionado, http://www.cverdad.org.pe/lacomision/
nlabor/comisionado.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2008); Sabrina Marian Reisinger, Truth, Race
and Reconciliation; Ayacucho and the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Nov.
8, 2005) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Florida State University), http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/
available/etd-11082005-203231/.
9 HAYNER, supra note 8, at 260-61.
97 Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 1, translated in Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26,
at 75.
98 See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 2; Gonzfilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 75.
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the Public Prosecutor99 and the courts in their constitutionally granted
duties.100
One example of the expansive nature of the CVR mandate is the
Commission's sweeping subject-matter jurisdiction. 10 1 The list of crimes
included the phrase "and other serious injuries" after the crime of tor-
ture, and the phrase "[o] ther crimes and serious violations of the rights
of individuals" to possibly include further abuses of State power, such as
sex crimes, forced internal displacements, due process violations and
genocide.102 Similarly, the decree authorized the CVR to focus on
"[v]iolations of the collective rights of the country's Andean and native
communities."103 Moreover, the mandate broadly defined personal ju-
risdiction to leave open the possibility to examine acts committed by
State agents, members of "terrorist organizations" and members of pa-
ramilitary organizations. 10 4 This grant of jurisdiction was in direct op-
position to Fujimori's 1995 amnesty laws and signified a possible end to
the impunity that security forces had enjoyed under Fujimori's re-
gime.105
The CVR embarked on the country's largest and most ambitious
human rights project in Peruvian history and clarified the magnitude
99 Ministeyio Pblico.
100 Gonzdlez Cueva, supra note 26, at 75, 80; Gonzilez Cueva Interview, supra note 48.
101 See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 3. "The Truth Commission shall focus its
work on...
(a) Murders and kidnappings;
(b) Forced disappearances;
(c) Torture and other serious injuries;
(d) Violations of the collective rights of the country's Andean and native com-
munities;
(e) Other crimes and serious violations of the rights of individuals."
Id., translated in Gonzdlez Cueva, supra note 26, at 92.
102 Id.; Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 76 (noting that the question as to what law to
apply was hotly debated in the Commission's Working Group). The Ministry of Justice
included the application of International Human Rights Law and International Humani-
tarian Law. See Gonzdlez Cueva, supra note 26, at 76. The representatives of the security
forces rejected the inclusion of the laws of war, as these laws would implicitly give the
twenty-year conflict internal armed conflict status. See id.
103 Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 3, translated in GonzAlez Cueva, supra note 26,
at 92.
104 d. arts. 1 & 3; Gonzalez Cueva, supra note 26, at 76. Later talks would apply the "pa-
ramilitary groups" category to the several death squads that emerged during the two dec-
ades of conflict either indirectly or directly under the auspices of the Armed Forces. See
Gonzalez Cueva, supra note 26, at 76.
105 See Law 26479 of June 14, 1995 (Peru); Law 26492 of June 28, 1995 (Peru); Gon-
zalez Cueva, supra note 26, at 72-73; Gonzilez Cueva Interview, supra note 48.
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of the atrocities committed by and against fellow Peruvians. 10 6 The
Commission's findings in its August 2003 Final Report included statis-
tics showing that almost 70,000 people were killed or "disappeared,"
and of those, more than ninety percent came from the eight poorest
Andean and Amazonian regions. 0 7 In addition, more than seventy per-
cent of victims spoke Quechua as their native language. 08 Thus, the
findings demonstrated that victims of the armed conflict were over-
whelmingly low-income, rural, indigenous peasants with little or no po-
litical or economic power in Peruvian society.' 9
As for those responsible for the conflict and its outcomes, the CVR
promoted a comprehensive and inclusive notion of accountability." 0 The
Final Report found State limitations in protecting fundamental rights of
its citizens and securing the public order, as well as breaches of the con-
stitutional order and rule of law in numerous moments of crisis
throughout the internal conflict."' Although the two terrorists groups--
the Shining Path and the Tfipac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA)--carried the bulk of the responsibility for systematic abuses
and violence during the armed conflict, the Report also held state, po-
litical, and social entities responsible for many of the gross human rights
violations.112
III. TRUTH OMISSIONS FROM THE CVR's FINAL REPORT
A. Broad Mandate, Restricted Inteipretation
Even with the CVR's comprehensive and inclusive notions of ac-
countability, various organizations criticized and questioned the Com-
mission's decision to exclude cases of violations with ambiguous or tan-
106 See Degregori, supra note 20. The CVR collected nearly 17,000 testimonies from
across the country, conducted almost 2000 interviews and talked to the main national po-
litical and military leaders during the years 1980-2000. Id.
107 See Degregori, supra note 20.
108 Id. The Final Report also gives the astonishing statistic that according to the 1993 cen-
sus, only sixteen percent of the Peruvian population were native Quechua-speakers. FINAL
REPORT, supra note 9, at 1(6). Also, the people from these regions together represent only
nine percent of the income of all Peruvian families. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 15.
109 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 1(6); Degregori, supra note 20.
110 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, passim (holding accountable the Shining Path, the
MRTA, Peruvian police and Armed Forces, self-defense committees, the various govern-
ment parties in power during the conflict, the Peruvian legislature and judiciary, trade
organizations, the educational system, the Church, human rights organizations, and the
media).
M See id. at 1(10)-(l11).112 See id. at 11-V.
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gential relations to the armed conflict in the Final Report."13 Without a
general policy to guide decision-making among the Commission's re-
gional offices, Commissioners drew different lines as to which cases to
investigate and publish under the mandate. 114 As a result, cases such as
those of the enforced sterilizations during the Fujimori regime were
not considered in the context of insurgency or counter-insurgency and
thus were seen by some of the Commissioners as outside of the Com-
mission's mandate and not included in the CVR's Final Report.115
Because the Executive gave the CVR a sufficiently broad mandate
to include State-sponsored enforced sterilizations, the Commission's
omission was a self-imposed, interpretive-albeit inattentive- restric-
tion on the Commission's investigation and Final Report." 6 Of course,
truth commissioners must make certain choices as to which cases
commissions investigate and report as a result of time constraints, re-
source limits, insufficient information, unreliable evidence, repetition
of wrongs already documented elsewhere, and political pressures. 117
Reports should not, however, exclude cases of gross human rights viola-
tions if the effects are to perpetuate discrimination, racism, and clas-
sism as well as to impede justice, including reproductive justice, for vic-
tims." 8 Rather, commissioners should make a careful and conscientious
effort to investigate and report abuses committed against the most dis-
enfranchised members of society, especially when their mandate so re-
quires, but even when it is ambiguous. 119 In the case of the CVR its
113 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-20; interview with Carlos Ivin Degregori, for-
mer Commissioner of the Peruvian Truth Commission, in Ithaca, N.Y (Nov. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Degregori Interview].
114 See id.
115 See Gianella, supra note 70, at 3; Guilia Tamayo, Metas que Matan, http://w3.
desco.org.pe/publicaciones/QH/QH/qhll lgt.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). During sepa-
rate interviews, two of the Peruvian Truth Commission's Commissioners, Salom6n Lerner
Febres and Carlos Ivin Degregori, stated that they did not think that these enforced steriliza-
tion cases were within the Truth Commission's mandate. However, after looking at the text of
the mandate once more, each one remarked that these cases could have been included in
the mandate and that they were overlooked due to a lack of time and resources. Degregori
Interview, supra note 113; Interview with Salom6n Lerner Febres, former President of the
Peruvian Truth Commission, in Lima, Pert (June 15, 2006) [hereinafter Lerner Febres In-
terview].
116 See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM; Degregori Interview, supra note 113; Lerner
Febres Interview, supra note 115.
117 See HAYNER, supra note 8, at 73.
118 See id. at 24-31, 73; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 1-2, 19-20.
119 See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM, passim; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-20.
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mandate's broad language required an investigation of enforced sterili-
zations.120 Priscilla Hayner argues that:
[T] he practice of rape and other sexual crimes should be fully
acknowledged in a commission's report where it is believed
such a practice was widespread. If a truth commission does
not take special care in addressing this issue, it is likely that it
will remain largely shrouded in silence and hidden from the
history books-and also likely that few policy, educational, or
reparatory measures will be put in place to assist past victims,
increase the public understanding of the issue, or reduce the
prevalence of sexual abuse in the future. 121
In the cases of enforced sterilizations, the CVR did not make such a
conscientious, inclusive effort. 122 As a result, impoverished, indigenous
Quechua-speaking women continued to face multiple layers of dis-
crimination-including social, racial, and gender discrimination-first
as victims and later as unrecognized victims of State repression and de-
nial of basic human rights during the twenty-year internal conflict.123
Thus, the omission of enforced sterilization cases excluded women who
were already members of socially and politically marginalized groups
and greatly decreased their chances for truth, accountability, and jus-
tice in Peruvian society.124
The CVR Commissioners could give reasons for excluding enforced
sterilization cases from their investigation and report, such as the man-
date's restriction or the repetition of other investigations or reports, but
none should outweigh the reasons to include such widespread, State-
sponsored violations of reproductive rights as part of Peru's official col-
lective memory.125 First, Commissioners did not see enforced steriliza-
tions as an included crime in the Truth Commission's mandate. 126 In
contrast to the CVs inclusive mandate, the mandate of the South Afri-
120 See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM, passim.
121 HAYNER, supra note 8, at 78-79.
122 See id.; FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, passim.
123 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-20.
124 See id. at 1-2, 19-20; HAYNER, supra note 8, at 24-31; MINOW, supra note 4, at 24-27.
125 See Degregori Interview, supra note 113; Lerner Febres Interview, supra note 115. In
speaking with CVR Commissioners, they defended their non-inclusion of the enforced
sterilizations cases by pointing to the separate investigations and reports written on the
subject. See Degregori Interview, supra note 113; Lerner Febres Interview, supra note 115.
This, however, is not a valid reason for exclusion because all cases of violence reported by
the Commission required an independent and effective investigation as well. See Supreme
Decree 065-2001-PCM arts. 1-3.
126 See Degregori Interview, supra note 113; Gonzilez Cueva Interview, supra note 48.
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can Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) did not cover all of
the abusive practices of apartheid, especially with regards to detention
without trial, racial segregation, and the practice of "forced removals" of
blacks to barren lands. 127 Failing to include these and other apartheid
practices in the final report, even where justified because the practices
were already well-documented, "prevented many South Africans from
seeing their own personal experience reflected in the commission's
work." 28 Despite its restrictive mandate, the South African TRC held
institutional hearings and found fault with some social and institutional
structures of the apartheid system.'2 This limited investigation, how-
ever, did not counter the South African TRC's inclusion of mostly ex-
treme violence to the exclusion of a comprehensive investigation and
report on the widespread State-sponsored systematic abuses committed
against many Africans. °30 This exclusion, as a result, hindered the TRC's
goal to ensure social justice for the African majority. 3
Unlike the South African TRC, however, the Peruvian CVR's ex-
ecutive mandate did not limit the scope of investigations or reports to
exclude enforced sterilizations. 3 2 In fact, it specifically endorsed a
broad mandate which could have included systemic abuses such as co-
erced surgical sterilizations. 33 Although the CVR's Final Report did
recognize the rights of women and the gross violations of human
rights-including finding rape to be an instrument of torture-com-
mitted against women largely by the Peruvian Armed Forces, it still fell
short by excluding gross, systematic human rights abuses of enforced
sterilizations against mainly low-income, indigenous Quechua
women. 3 4 Because the decree did not make distinctions between those
human rights violations directly related to insurgency or counter-
insurgency measures and those violations tangentially related, the
Commissioners should not have made such distinctions that have led to
the exclusion of more than 200,000 cases of enforced sterilizations
from the Commission's Final Report.135 In doing so, the Commission
allowed Lima, the capital city and center of political discourse and pub-
127 See HAYNER, supra note 8, at 73; WILSON, supra note 8, at 34.
12 8 HAYNER, supra note 8, at 73.
129 See WILSON, supra note 8, at 35-36.
130 See id. at 35.
1s1 See id.
132 Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM art. 3.
lS3 Id.
134 SeeAmnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 18, 19-20, FINAL REPORT, supm note 9, at Il(A) (46).
135 See Supreme Decree 065-2001-PCM arts. 1 & 3; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-
20; Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 78.
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lic opinion, to remain "emotionally distant" from these victims of State-
supported violence and helped to further alienate many victims from
the CVR's work.1 36 In this regard, the CVR helps to perpetuate and le-
gitimize physical, racial, and class divides in Peruvian society and im-
pedes public support for accountability and reproductive justice
through the rule of law.137
Additionally, the CVR Commissioners' reasoning did not apply in
all cases since they were inconsistent when they investigated and pub-
lished other crimes Fujimori committed-largely in the context of
political corruption and authoritarian rule-during his regime that
may not directly relate to the insurgency or counter-insurgency 1 38 Be-
cause incontrovertible evidence that demonstrated high levels of state
and political corruption naturally affected Peruvians with economic
and political power, public outrage and media coverage demanded
that the CVR investigate and record those atrocities. 139 Therefore,
those abuses of power became part of the historical record, and ef-
forts today continue to push for accountability and criminal responsi-
bility for the corruption crimes that Fujimori committed against Pe-
ruvians.14 In the end, this inconsistency and selective treatment of
cases demonstrates that, at least for the excluded victims of enforced
sterilization, the truth-seeking process cannot be seen as "more than
the reconfiguration of government pacts or domination between el-
ites." 141 As a result, in this version of reconciliation, the same speakers
are speaking and the same voiceless victims are silenced.1 42
B. Enforced Sterilizations of Quechua Women as Genocide
1. The Elements of Genocide
When a Congressional subcommittee investigated cases of en-
forced sterilizations and issued its report, it accused the Fujimori re-
gime of committing genocide against the Quechua people through the
1s6 Degregori, supra note 20.
137 See id.
138 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at IH(D); Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 78.
139 See CONAGHAN, supra note 49, at 229; KIMBERLY THEIDON, ENTRE PR6JIMos: EL CON-
FLICTO ARMADO INTERNO Y LA POLITICA DE LA RECONCILIACI6N EN EL PERO 256 (2004).
140 See Raul Rosasco, YDespuds de la CVR Qui?: Informe Seminal Sobre las Reacciones al In-
forme Final de la CVR y los Avances Respecto a sus Recomendaciones, Nov. 14-20, 2005, at 3.
141 THEIDON, supra note 139, at 256 (author's translation).
142 Id.
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Family Planning Program.143 There are arguments for and against clas-
sifying these cases of enforced sterilizations as acts of genocide, and
these arguments will be discussed below.144 Ultimately, however, the vic-
tims of these human rights abuses need an impartial, independent in-
vestigation to take these issues out of the political realm and into the
discourse of individual and collective reparations as well as reproduc-
tive justice. 45
First, the term "genocide" combines the Greek word genos (race or
tribe) with the Latin suffix -ide (killing), and is the intentional killing,
destruction or extermination of groups or members of a group. 146 The
crime of genocide is recognized as part of customary international law
and a part of jus cogens, the body of peremptory international norms.147
In addition, Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 defines genocide as follows:
[A] ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group. 14
143 AQV, supra note 56, at 108.
144 See infra notes 135-171 and accompanying text.
145 See infra Part I(D).
146 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 127 (2d. ed. 2008); KRiANGSAK
KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 67-68 (2001).
147 KITrICHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 67. Under customary international law, the
United Nations summit in September 2005 adopted the Outcome Document, which af-
firms that every state is responsible for protecting its citizens from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission of Inquiry's Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REv.
1703, 1703 (2006).
148 Genocide Convention, supra note 77. The Convention does prohibit genocide in
times of war, in times of peace and holds perpetrators (and other participants) of genocide
criminally responsible, while holding the state responsible as well. See id.
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The definition deliberately omits acts of cultural and political genocide,
and the Convention provides an ineffective enforcement through do-
mestic trials in the state where the genocide occurred.1 49 Much pro-
gress, however, has occurred at the international level to prosecute and
punish perpetrators of genocide. For example, the statutes of the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) provide for criminal action against perpe-
trators of genocide. 150 The ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone have tried individuals charged with geno-
cide and have delivered landmark decisions that shape the evolving
standards and norms for this crime against humanity.151
In order to prove genocide, victims must fall under one or more of
the definition's enumerated groups.15 2 To determine whether an enu-
merated group exists in a particular case, a court may analyze subjective
criteria, objective criteria, or both. 153 In a subjective analysis, the court
"tak[es] into account the relevant evidence and the political and cul-
tural context of the society concerned" on a case-by-case basis.154 For
instance, in the case of Rwanda, the court examined the perceptions of
Hutu and Tutsi members as well as Rwandan authorities adopted from
colonial rule that Hutus and Tutsis belonged to two distinct ethnic
groups.155 Alternatively, the court may use objective facts that indicate a
population is a group with a distinct identity, such as state recognition
or customary practices.'5 6 In the case of Rwanda, the government re-
quired every citizen to carry identity cards displaying their ethnic iden-
tity as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, and the country's legislation at the time re-
ferred to citizens by their respective ethnic groups. 57
149 See CASSESE, supra note 146, at 130-32. Cultural Genocide is destroying a group's
language or culture. Id. at 130. Political Genocide is exterminating a group based on po-
litical grounds. Id.
150 Id. at 132.
151 Id. See generally Prosecutor v. Jelisid, Case No. IT 95-10, Judgment (Dec. 14, 1999),
affid, Case No. IT 95-10-A (July 5, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No.
ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment (May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-TJudg-
ment (Sept. 2, 1998).
152 See KrrICHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 69.
153 Id. at 70-71.
154 Id. at 71 (citing Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3,Judgment, 55 (Dec.
6, 1999)).
155 Id.
156 See id. There were objective indicators in the Rutaganda case, such as identity cards
carried by the Tutsi population as well as the fact that customary determination of group
membership was patrilineal. Id.
157 KrrlICHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 71.
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In addition, a perpetrator commits genocide through the defimi-
tion's enumerated discriminatory acts or omissions with the necessary
mens rea.158 These acts or omissions, however, do not necessarily in-
volve the actual extinction or annihilation of the group, and motive is
not an element of the crime of genocide. 59 Thus, the individual ac-
cused of genocide must have either known or should have known that
"his act [or omission] would destroy, in whole or in part [the] pro-
tected group." 60 In contrast to the crime against humanity of perse-
cution, which requires a discriminatory intent, genocide requires that
the prosecution prove the accused possessed the specific intent to de-
stroy a particular group beyond a reasonable doubt.161
In order to prove genocidal intent, the prosecution must show that
the accused wanted either to destroy a large number of group members
or to exterminate a limited number of group members selected be-
cause their annihilation would greatly impact the group's survival. 62
Thus, killing or sterilizing a large number of women group members
who are of child bearing age can be considered genocide even though
they do not comprise a large percentage of the group's population. 63
Also, the accused must form his specific intent to commit genocide be-
fore acting in furtherance of the genocidal intent. 64
Although the crimes committed must demonstrate genocidal in-
tent, the prosecution can prove the element of intent by inferring from
"facts such as words or deeds or a pattern of purposeful action that de-
liberately, consistently, and systematically targets victims on account of
their membership of a particular group while excluding the members
of other groups."165 Evidence to construct genocidal intent may include
the general context of other acts committed against the same group,
the physical targeting of the group, the extent of bodily injury, the me-
thodical nature of planning, and the scale of actual or attempted de-
158 Id. (citing Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 1 497; Jelisic, Case No. IT 95-10, 1 62).
Thus, failing to stop a massacre when the individual had the means and notice to stop it
could be regarded as genocide. See id.
159 Id. at 71, 76; see STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR Hu-
MAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 29
(2d ed. 2001).
160 KrITICHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 72 (quoting Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T,
1520).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 73.
163 See id.
16 Id. (citing Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, 91).
165 KITrlCHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 74.
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struction of the group.166 In the end, even though it is difficult to prove
genocidal intent in the case of an individual backed by the State, prov-
ing the required specific intent for genocide is somewhat easier than
originally anticipated through the use of circumstantial evidence.
167
2. Applying the Elements of Genocide Under the Convention to the
Case of Enforced Sterilizations in Peru
A strong case can be made that the enforced sterilizations of more
than 200,000 low-income, indigenous Quechua-speaking women were
acts of genocide. 168 First, the indigenous Quechua-speaking women are
members of two protected groups enumerated in the defmition of
genocide since the Quechua people are a distinct racial and ethnic
group in Peru. 169 The indigenous Quechua people objectively belong
to a racial group since they share common, constant, and hereditary
features, and are an ethnic group since they are "a community of per-
sons linked by the same customs, the same language and the same
race."170 Additionally, from a subjective analysis, the racial and ethnic
divides among criollos, mestizos, cholos, and indigenas in Peruvian society
also contribute to the notion that the Quechua people are a distinct
cultural group. 171 Although the overt motive behind Fujimori's Family
Planning Program was to curb population growth and to alleviate pov-
erty on a massive scale, it is clear that because motive is not an element
of genocide, indigenous Quechua women would not lose their pro-
tected group status. 172 In other words, their protected status as mem-
bers of a racial or ethnic group would override their status as a member
of a particular social demographic. 73 Therefore, the motive of popula-
tion control would not negate an intention to prevent births within the
16 6 Id.
167 See id. at 74-75.
168 See Genocide Convention, supra note 77, art. I; RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 159,
at 33-35.
169 See Genocide Convention, supra note 77, art. II.
170 See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 33 (quoting STIFAN GLASER, DROrr IN-
TERNATIONAL PNAL CONVENTIONNEL 111-12 (1970), translated and quoted in Study of the
Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, prepared by
Nicodhme Ruhashyamiko,July 4, 1978, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416, at 15-16).
171 See Degregori, supra note 20.
172 See Coe, supra note 29, at 56, 61; cf RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 35. These
authors speak of "political groups" and do not speak specifically of poverty as a group.
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 35. The same could be said for poverty as a status
incidental to (and not overriding) a group's protected status. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra
note 159, at 35.
173 See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 33-35.
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group. 174 As a result, one could prove that Fujimori's Family Planning
Program intended to prevent births among the Quechua people, de-
spite his alleged motives.1 7
5
Next, those individuals responsible for orchestrating enforced ster-
ilizations against indigenous Quechua women arguably acted with the
necessary mens rea to commit genocide since they knew or should have
known that these coercive sterilizations would destroy, in whole or in
part, the Quechua people. 76 Highly probative evidence with which one
could infer genocidal intent would include the Family Planning Pro-
gram's specific targeting of poor indigenous women and the systematic
nature of its quota system, articulated in the 1989 Plan for a Govern-
ment of National Reconstruction, or "Plan Verde." 177 Specifically, the
Plan stated that it was necessary to quickly curb population growth and
mandate treatment for the "surplus beings [through a] generalized
sterilization use among those culturally backward and impoverished
groups."i7 8 The Plan continued by arguing that because those individu-
als from the targeted areas possessed "incorrigible characters" and
lacked resources, all that was left was their "total extermination." 79
Seeking out particular groups to sterilize in violation of reproductive
rights and imposing upon health care providers an obligatory quota
system which caused coercive practices demonstrate a destructive pat-
tern on the part of government officials to prevent births within the
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 KITrCHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 72 (quoting Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T,
520).
177 See Historia de una Traici6n: Muchos Misterios Quedardn Revalados al Conocerse el Plan
Militar que Se Consolid6 el 5-IV-92, at 9 (1993), http://www.resistencia.org/documentos/el_
plan-verde/historia de unajtraicion.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2008); Amnesty Int'l, supra
note 8, at 20.
178 Historia de una Traici6n, supra note 177, at 9 (author's translation). The Plan reads
in Spanish:
Ha quedado demonstrado la necesidad de frenar lo mis pronto posible el
crecimiento demogrfifico y urge, adicionalmente, un tratamiento para los ex-
cedentes existentes: utilizaci6n generalizada de esterilizaci6n en los grupos
culturalmente atrasados y econ6micamente pauperizados .... Los mkodos
compulsivos deben tener solo ciracter experimental, pero deben ser norma
en todos los centros de salfid la ligadura de trompas .... Hay que discriminar
el excedente poblacional y los sectores nocivos de la poblaci6n. Para estos
sectores, dado su ciracter de incorrigibles y la carencia de recursos ... solo
queda su exterminio total.
Id.
179 Id. (author's translation).
[Vol. 29:1
HeinOnline -- 29 B.C. Third World L.J. 26 2009
Enforced Sterilization & the Peruvian Truth Commission
indigenous Quechua-speaking population. 8° Moreover, under Fuji-
mori's population control program, there existed a clear pattern of vic-
tims-namely poor, indigenous Quechua-speaking women-a high
level of planning at the state level through the formal Family Planning
Program, and a large number of victims considering that in 1993 only a
fifth of Peru's population spoke Quechua or other native languages.181
On the other hand, there are legal and practical concerns with
classifying the enforced sterilization of Quechua women as an act of
genocide. 182 For example, one could argue that the State did not ad-
minister population control and family planning programs to Quechua
women to the exclusion of other racial and ethnic groups from en-
forced sterilization procedures. 183 This argument is weak, however, be-
cause perpetrators of genocide can theoretically have the specific intent
to destroy more than one protected group under the auspices of a sin-
gle State-sponsored plan to eradicate poverty and curb population
growth through sterilization procedures. 184 Also, as a practical matter,
conservative groups in Peru and abroad who oppose contraception and
reproductive choice for women have capitalized on the classification of
the Voluntary Surgical Contraception program as an act of genocide.18 5
As a result, international human rights advocates who promote ac-
countability and justice for crimes against humanity and genocide must
make strategic choices since their decisions and actions could nega-
tively affect future reproductive rights, choice, and health among
Quechua women who have already been victims of State-enforced ster-
ilization campaigns.1 6
C. Enforced Sterilizations as Violations of Individual Human Rights
Aside from the viable claim that the systematic enforced steriliza-
tions against Quechua women constituted an act of genocide, these ac-
tions also implicate numerous violations of other human rights, includ-
180 See id.; Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20.
181 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 15.
182 See id., at 20; seeAQV, supra note 56, at 108.
18 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20. Indigenous Amazonian women were also
among those who reported enforced sterilization procedures. Id.
184 See KrICHAISAREE, supra note 146, at 72-75.
18 See AQV, supra note 56, at 108; CAceres et al., supra note 52, at 143. Within a year of
Toledo's election into presidency, a conservative Catholic Opus Dei physician was ap-
pointed as Health Minister of Peru, and later went on to become the country's Prime Min-
ister. ARAMBURU, supra note 52, at 11.
186 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 20; AQV, supra note 56, at 108; Cficeres et al., su-
pra note 52, at 143.
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ing reproductive rights, under national, regional, and international
law.'87 Legal instruments that obligate Peru to protect women against
enforced sterilization include, but are not limited to, the Peruvian Con-
stitution, 188 the American Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention), 189 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), 190 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR), 19' and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 92 The protective
provisions enumerated within these instruments include those that pro-
tect the right to personal autonomy, privacy, bodily integrity, and
autonomous decision-making in women's reproductive lives.193
For instance, the Peruvian Constitution guarantees all Peruvians
the right to dignity; life; moral, psychological, and physical integrity;
liberty and security of the person; and to be free from all forms of vio-
lence and from torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 194 Thus,
the State has the duty to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights
through national laws and legal mechanisms to investigate and punish
violations. In the case of enforced sterilizations, the Peruvian gov-
ernment has enacted laws to protect women; however, these laws are
not enforced and violators continue to enjoy impunity from punish-
187 See, e.g., infra notes 188-192.
188 CONSTrrucI6N POLiTICA DEL PER6 [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF PERU] [hereinaf-
ter PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION].
189 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]. In addi-
tion, the Convention of Belem do Patti protects women against all forms of violence, in-
cluding violence within the health care system. See Inter-American Convention on the Pre-
vention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1534 [hereinafter Convention Belem do Pard].
190 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
191 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
192 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. The Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women recognizes "that some groups of women, such as women belonging
to minority groups, indigenous women, refugee women, migrant women, women living in rural
or remote communities, destitute women, women in institutions or in detention, female
children, women with disabilities, elderly women, and women in situations of armed conflict,
are especially vulnerable to violence." Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,1 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994) (emphasis added).
193 See supra notes 172-176.
194 SeePERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 188, at ch.1, arts. 1, 2-1, 2-24(a), 2-24(h).
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ment. 195 Even though abuses such as enforced sterilizations have been
documented, public authorities have dismissed the violations as iso-
lated incidents, and health care professionals paternalistically defend
their actions as beneficial to their patients and "intended to avoid
greater injury to the patient."196 In light of these protections, women
victims of enforced sterilizations have viable claims at the national
level to remedy the wrongs committed against them.
197
Many of these national protections, however, are unenforceable or
inaccessible to the low-income women-victims of the Voluntary Surgical
Contraception program.198 Thus, complaints to regional or interna-
tional human rights bodies are also valid and actionable claims. 199 The
American Convention, for example, protects individuals' rights to life;
personal integrity; health; to provide free and informed consent; pri-
vacy; equality; and non-discrimination. 200 Public health care providers
violated these rights when they performed unnecessary surgery on
women-victims without obtaining informed consent, as well as when, in
certain circumstances, they failed to perform preliminary examinations
or to give post-operative care, which ultimately led to death and disabil-
ity for women-victims.20 1
Under the ICCPR, Peru has committed itself to respect, protect
and fulfill its citizens' civil and political rights, including the rights to
life, non-discrimination, gender equality, liberty, personal security,
195 See, e.g., General Law on Health arts. 4, 6, 15, 26, 27 & 40 (promulgated by Legisla-
tive Decree No. 26842, July 15, 1997) (protecting rights to life and health); PERUVIAN PE-
NAL CODE art. 376 (promulgated by Legislative Decree No. 635, Apr. 3, 1991) (abuse of
authority). There is no crime of infliction of suffering on patients by health care providers.
See CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 42-43.
196 CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 43.
197 See generally PERUVIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 188; General Law on Health, supra
note 195; PERUVIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 195.
198 See CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 41-48. See generally CTR. FOR REPROD. RTs.
& DEMUS: EsTUDIO PARA LA DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DE LA MUJER, WOMEN OF THE
WORLD: LAWS AND POLITICS THAT AFFECT THEIR REPRODUCTIVE LIVES, LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN 170-92 (1997); CmR. FOR REPROD. RTs. & DEMUS: ESTUDIO PARA LA
DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DE LA MUJER, WOMEN OF THE WORLD: LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN PROGRESS REPORT 2000, at 83-102 (2001) (reporting on the laws regarding
reproductive health and lives of women in Peru).
199 See American Convention, supra note 189, arts. 4, 5, 7, 11 & 24. In order for a com-
plaint to be admissible, the applicant must prove that she has exhausted all local remedies
or that special circumstances exist that make exhaustion of local remedies impossible. For
a more complete explanation, see Thomas Buergenthal, The U.N. Human Rights Committee,
5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N.C. 341, 364-81 (2001); Velfisquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4. (July 29, 1988).
200 See American Convention, supra note 189, arts. 4, 5, 7, 11 & 24.
201 See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTs., supra note 71, at 12-16.
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and privacy, along with freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment. 20 2 Additionally, the ICESCR protects the rights
to non-discrimination, equality, and health.203 Similarly, under the
CEDAW, Peru guarantees rights to women that protect against en-
forced sterilization under Articles 5, 12, and 16, which are further ar-
ticulated in General Recommendations 19, 21, and 24.204 For exam-
ple, in General Recommendation 19, the CEDAW Committee asks
States to take measures to "prevent coercion in regard to fertility and
reproduction." 205 All of these State duties at international law give in-
dividual women-victims of enforced sterilizations the ability to hold
the Peruvian government responsible for the human rights violations
committed against them.
The Peruvian government officially acknowledged State responsi-
bility for violations of international law under the American Convention
when it settled the case of Maria Mamrita Mestanza Chdvez v. Peri.2 6 Spe-
cifically, the settlement agreement recognized State violations of the vic-
tim's rights to life, physical integrity, humane treatment, equal protec-
tion of the law, and freedom from gender-based violence.20 7 Although
settlement agreements with the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights are not binding jurisprudence at international law, these recogni-
tions of State responsibility are highly persuasive admissions to use in
any further legal action at the regional or international levels.208 More-
over, the Peruvian government undertook to investigate and punish
those responsible for the violations as well as to reform legislation and
create procedures to handle patient complaints within the health care
system.2 09 As a result, ongoing rights violations are occurring as long as
202 See ICCPR, supra note 190, arts. 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 & 17.
203 See ICESCR, supra note 191, arts. 2, 3 & 12.
204 See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], Report of
the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 24,
22, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (Jan. 1, 1999); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women [CEDAW], Report of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, General Recommendation No. 21, 22, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (Jan. 1, 1994); Comm. on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], Report of the Comm. on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19, 1 22, U.N. Doc.
A/47/38 (Feb. 19, 1993) [hereinafter CEDAW General Recommendation 19].
205 CEDAW General Recommendation 19, supra note 204.
206 See Maria Mamhrita Mestanza Chivez v. Per6, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 71/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/Ill18, doc. 70 rev. 2 1 1, 14 (2003).
207 See id.; CR. FOR REPROD. Rrs., supra note 71, at 16.
208 See American Convention, supra note 189, at art. 48.
209 See CR. FOR REPROD. RTs., supra note 71, at 16-17.
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Peru fails to implement these changes and denies women-victims their
rights at national, regional, and international law.210
D. The Need for an Independent and Impartial Investigation
The CVR Commissioners recognized that other bodies within
Peru's government and civil society either had conducted or were in
the process of conducting their own investigations and reports on the
cases of enforced sterilizations. 211 Although a Congressional subcom-
mittee and numerous activist groups investigated and published tes-
timonies and cases condemning the State's Family Planning Program
and its health care providers, members of each of these bodies had a
specific political or social interest in advocating certain positions and
conclusions. 2 12 In contrast, the CVR was in a unique and disinterested
position to evaluate, as it could have based "conclusions and recom-
mendations on a close study of the record, while standing as an inde-
pendent institution separate from the systems under review."213 Opin-
ion polls in Lima confirmed the public confidence in the
performance of the CVR and the positive impact the public saw the
Final Report have on Peru.214 In addition, most individuals opined
that the government should implement the CVR's recommendations
for reparations, reform, and justice.215 The CVR's widespread public
support and overall legitimacy helped create some institutional mo-
mentum to keep the possibility of criminal justice and accountability
open for the future, but only for those cases investigated and re-
ported.216 Thus, the exclusion of State-sponsored enforced steriliza-
tions in the Final Report effectively impeded future criminal judicial
action for thousands of marginalized Quechua women in Peru.2 17
The conservative Congressional Committee members who submit-
ted the final report on conclusions and recommendations in cases of
State-led enforced sterilization campaigns have politicized these human
rights abuses and have used human rights language to strategically re-
strict reproductive choice for Peruvian women through repeals of laws
that make surgical sterilization a legal option for reproductive choice in
210 See id.
211 Gonzilez Cueva, supra note 26, at 83-89.
212 See CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 7.
213 See HAYNER, supra note 8, at 29.
214 SeeAmnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 27.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 See id.
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Peru. 218 As mentioned above, these conservatives are utilizing their in-
vestigation and report on human rights abuses to recommend commit-
ting further human rights abuses against women. 219 During the Toledo
regime, reproductive rights and health advances had nearly halted. 220
For example, new policy initiatives stress abstinence-only methods for
sexually transmissible infection (STI) prevention and natural methods
for family planning.2 21 In addition, government agencies have stopped
promoting gender equality and sexual education, and health officials
have prevented access to services and information on modern methods
of contraception. 222 These programs and future strategies have further
subordinated women in Peruvian society and have increased reliance on
natural reproductive methods and unsafe abortions. 223
Including the cases of enforced sterilizations in the CVR Final Re-
port or even creating a separate impartial truth commission investigat-
ing and reporting these State-sponsored abuses could have served to
prevent claims of genocide from instilling fear and causing a conserva-
tive backlash in reproductive rights issues. 224 In addition, including
these cases in the Commission's report could have created a legitimate
independent declaration of human rights abuses as acts of genocide
and as individual violations of reproductive choice and health.225
Moreover, including these cases could have kept these human rights
atrocities out of the political arena and in the hands of the victims who
deserve retribution, reparations, and reconciliation.2 26 Although in-
cluding these abuses would not have guaranteed a tangible victory for
the victims or their families, it would have constituted a moral, symbolic
victory for low-income, rural Quechua women and a step forward in an
uphill battle for recognition as Peruvian citizens.2 27 Though the Peru-
218 See AQV, supra note 56, passim; CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 7; Coe, supra
note 29, at 65.
219 See AQV, supra note 56, passim; CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 7; Coe, supra
note 29, at 65.
220 See Coe, supra note 29, at 65.
221 Id.
222 Id. For example, HIV prevention was part of a "Risk Reduction" program that also
included malaria, dengue and other infectious diseases. Id.
223 Id. Coe argues that U.S. policy shifts toward the far right have also threatened re-
productive rights in Peru. Id.
224 See Ciceres et al., supra note 52, at 144-48; see also, supra, notes 211-223 and ac-
companying text.
225 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 27; HAYNER, supra note 8, at 29. These are the two
main arguments put forth by investigations and advocates. See, e.g., Chceres et al., supra
note 52, at 147-48, 162-63.
226 See CLADEM & CRLP, supra note 57, at 7.
227 See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 8, at 19-20; supra notes 8 and 12.
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vian government has issued a public apology for its mass sterilization
campaign, excluding these cases from any commission of inquiry
greatly reduces the possibility of individual accountability for the perpe-
trators and justice for the victims of enforced sterilizations in Peru. 228
CONCLUSION
A distinctive feature of truth commissions is their focus on victims,
reconciliation, and healing as well as their reporting to create a frame-
work to ensure transitional justice as a mechanism to deal with a na-
tion's past human rights abuses. 229 One problem, however, is that truth-
telling can never be comprehensive enough to encompass all of the
competing perceptions of past events. 230 In addition, healing and jus-
tice-especially in the field of reproductive rights and justice-seem
incompatible and unworkable where victims have no political power or
economic means to reconcile and rebuild their communities. 231 Com-
plex analyses by truth commissions, however, can produce a record and
collective memory to prevent future human rights violations, and the
exclusion of certain abuses creates a void in the attempt at finding
truth, reconciliation, and justice for transitional states.2 32
For more than 200,000 indigenous Quechua-speaking women in
Peru, time has not healed their wounds of the past. These individuals
deserve a legitimate, independent, and thorough investigation of the
human rights abuses committed against them. Even if a lack of re-
sources impedes the possibility for adequate monetary reparations or
legal action for reproductive justice, a good faith inquiry to uncover the
truth and an acknowledgement of past wrongs would constitute an im-
portant symbolic victory for indigenous rights, reproductive rights, and
human rights for the indigenous Quechua peoples of Peru. Restoring
dignity and recognizing individual rights of Quechua women could
succeed as a step toward bridging the economic, racial, and ethnic di-
vides that continue to perpetuate inequality, discrimination, and hatred
among Peruvians.
228 See AQV, supra note 56, at 108; Coe, supra note 29, at 65; supra notes 8 and 12. For a
discussion on the issues and problems surrounding reparations and public apologies, see
generally MiIow, supra note 4.
229 See MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AF-
TER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 60-61 (1998).
230 See id. at 62.
231 See id. at 63.
232 See id. at 78-79; Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Rec-
onciliation in Transitional Societies, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 661, 665 (2004).
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Official acknowledgment of the truth is extremely powerful in the
healing process, especially in an atmosphere previously dominated by
official denial.2 33 If this is the case, then no official acknowledgment of
truth after official denial can be equally powerful in impeding recon-
ciliation and healing. When truth commissions deprive certain indi-
viduals or groups of the opportunity to have their stories entered into
the historical record, they effectively-even if inadvertently--deny vic-
tims access to the public and political discourse and leave victims dis-
empowered in their struggle for justice and accountability. Future truth
commissions, thus, should ensure that the marginalized victims in soci-
ety do not remain silenced and alienated in the creation of the histori-
cal record and collective memory. When forgotten, history does have a
tendency to repeat itself.
233See HAYNER, supra note 8, at 27.
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